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EVALUATION OF THE ARMY CORRECTION PROGRAM

FINAL REPORT

Volume I: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

SUBMITTED TO
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY



BY

THE MENTORIS COMPANY

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1.0 SCOPE OF STUDY, PRINCIPAL FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1.1 Scope of Study

The study provides an evaluation of the Army Correction Program from three perspectives: (1) Analysis of the appropriateness of the current objectives and the extent to which the objectives are being met, (2) Economic analysis of the current and alternative Army Correction Programs, and (3) Analysis of the organizational effectiveness and management performance of the current Army Correction Program. The data collection effort and analysis phase of the study took place over the period October 1976 through March 1977 and was restricted to correctional/confinement facilities over the Continental United States (CONUS). Site visits were made to the United States Disciplinary Barracks (USDB) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, the United States Army Retraining Brigade (USARB) at Fort Riley, Kansas, and the confinement facilities at Fort Dix, New Jersey, Fort Knox, Kentucky and Fort Ord, California. The perspective of the study was limited to the domain of the Army Correction Program. As such, the impact on the Army Correction Program of various other activities such as law enforcement, court martial, administrative discharge, and non-judicial punishment were considered to be beyond the scope of study.

1.2 Principal Findings

The principal findings of the study are as follows:

- (1) The objectives of the Army Correction Program as stated in Army Regulations 190-47 are in conformance with Department of Defense Instruction 1325.4 and with Chapter 48 of Title 10 of the U.S. Code. The objectives also comply with the dominant concepts, programs and practices of Federal and State civilian corrections. However, these objectives are not entirely being met.
- (2) The Army Correction Program as structured and operated during the data gathering period of the study (i.e., October 1976 to March 1977) was not cost-effective. The operation, maintenance

and personnel cost (i.e., the direct cost) during the fiscal year 1976 was approximately \$45 million in 1976 dollars. When the indirect costs* are added, the total cost during the fiscal year 1976 becomes at least \$52 million. It is possible to modify the Army Correction Program so as to realize an annual cost saving of \$20 million while at the same time satisfy the objectives as stated in AR 190-47. The specifics of this cost-effective Army Correction Program are presented in Section 1.3.

- (3) No modifications can be made to the current objectives of the Army Correction Program which conform to the U.S. Code and the UCMJ, and which simultaneously lead to greater net benefits (benefits minus costs) to the Army than the cost-effective program described in Section 1.3. For example, the policy of transferring to the Federal system all offenders guilty of civilian-type crimes and of returning to duty on suspended sentence all offenders guilty of military-type crimes is not cost effective in the long run.** Also, the policy of summarily discharging all offenders from the Army and thus abolishing the Army Correction Program cannot be recommended because it will be contrary to Title 10 of the U.S. Code and the dominant concepts, programs and practices in civilian corrections.
- (4) The Army Correction Program, as it currently operates, does not function as a centralized system, but rather as a collection of

*The indirect costs include the cost of returning a soldier who should not have been returned to duty, and the cost of recruitment and training of a new recruit to replace a discharged soldier who should not have been discharged.

** This is due to two reasons. First, the Army cannot be expected to continue on an indefinite basis, to transfer offenders to the Federal system without having to pay for it sooner or later either directly or indirectly through budget adjustments. Secondly, since a majority of non-puritive discharge sentenced prisoners who are either returned to duty from confinement facilities or assigned to the USARB (not the majority of USARB graduates) eventually receive less than honorable discharge, it will be counter-productive and hence, expensive to return to duty all offenders guilty of military-type crime.

individual confinement/correctional facilities. This lack of centralization has been primarily responsible for creating nonuniformity in various practices and a system-wide imbalance between the capacities (i.e., staff, space etc.) of the individual facilities and their respective prisoner populations.

- (5) Qualifications of staff to conduct confinement/correction programs have been found to be excellent everywhere. The performance standards governing these programs, as reflected in AR 190-47, exceed in detail, scope and enlightenment the performance standards presently applied in the civilian counterpart.
- (6) The rehabilitative success of USDB prisoners is positively correlated with their vocational training program completion. No such correlation could be detected between rehabilitative success and the education program of the USDB. Yet, while 80% of the sample of USDB prisoners examined in this study participated in education programs, 60% participated in vocational training and only 36% received vocational training certificates.

1.3 Major Recommendations

The following is a list of major recommendations which are made in order for the Army Correction Program to operate in an efficient and cost-effective fashion:

- (1) Centralize the management of the Army Correction Program at the Department of Army level without allowing for any intermediate influence between HQDA and facilities such as the USARB and the USDB.
- (2) Utilize the research and evaluation expertise currently assembled at the USARB towards developing an Army-wide confinement/correction program planning and evaluation activity at the HQDA level.
- (3) Retain the USARB and the USDB, and assign post-trial prisoners to these two facilities as far as feasible.

- (4) Redesignate all ACF's, ICF's and TICF's into a single type of confinement facility primarily for pre-trial prisoners. Consolidate each confinement facility, as far as feasible, with other criminal justice activities of the Fort at which it is located (such as Military Police, Office of Judge Advocate General, etc.) so as to ensure optimal utilization of the facility.
- (5) Expand the scope of the vocational training programs at the USDB to improve their revenue generating capability as well as the rehabilitative prospects of prisoners. Emphasize training in the mass production of marketable commodities. Allow 'A' custody prisoners to complete their vocational training programs.
- (6) Install efficient fume exhaust systems in a number of vocational shops at the USDB where heavy fumes cause occupational hazards.
- (7) Expand the work release program of the USDB, and restore to duty a larger portion of USDB prisoners who request such restoration.

The basis for these recommendations are described in the following sections.

2.0 ANALYSIS OF ARMY CORRECTION OBJECTIVES

2.1 Conformity Among AR 190-47, DODI 1325.4 and Title 10 of U.S. Code

Sections 951 and 954 in Chapter 48 under Title 10 of U.S. Code (5 July 1968) in essence emphasize the reformative and rehabilitative aspects of correction rather than the punitive aspect. Education, training, reformation, provision for welfare of offenders and restoration to duty wherever feasible are encouraged. An effort to return the offenders to civilian life as useful citizens is called upon. To implement this Act, the Department of Defense issued instruction 1325.4 on 7 October 1968 prescribing guidelines for the treatment of military prisoners and the administration of military facilities. These guidelines are in conformity with the Act. The objectives of the Army Correction Program as outlined by Army Regulation 190-47 are stated below for ready reference:

- (1) Return to military duty the maximum possible number of military prisoners whose sentences do not include a punitive discharge as morally responsible and well-trained soldiers...
- (2) Return to civilian life, or restore to duty, as appropriate, the maximum possible number of military prisoners whose sentences include a punitive discharge, as morally responsible and well-trained individuals...
- (3) Identify and release from Army confinement facilities, through separation from service, or transfer to another appropriate Army confinement or correctional facility or the Federal correctional system, military prisoners who will not respond to or are incapable of effectively responding to Army correctional treatment, retraining or discipline.

These objectives are in agreement with the DODI and the Act. Hence, formulation of any new objectives which contradict the reformative and rehabilitative focus of the current version of AR 190-47 will necessitate a change of the Federal laws.

2.2 Conformity with Civilian Correction Objectives

The dominant characteristics of Federal and State civilian corrections are: (1) emphasis on rehabilitative models in theory and in practice, and (2) extensive use of probation, parole and other alternatives to incarceration. The objectives of the Army Correction Program are in general agreement with the dominant characteristics of civilian correction. However, there are two distinct differences. First, the Army does not use parole as extensively as is practiced in civilian correction. For example, during the Fiscal Year 76 and 77, approximately 14% of releases at the USDB were due to parole, whereas in civilian correction parole accounts for an overwhelming majority of releases. Secondly, the use of suspended sentence in the Army which is conceptually similar to the practice of probation in civilian correction does not include any formal program characteristic of probation.

It should be noted that there are a number of policies that are currently being advocated by various professionals in civilian corrections which represent major departures from the rehabilitative model. These include policies emphasizing swift and certain punishment, abandonment of the indeterminant sentence in favor of fixed, mandatory sentences or presumptive sentencing, abolishment of parole and maintenance of just, humane and safe custody. However, it is difficult to predict which course the civilian correction policies will take in the future because of the uncertainty surrounding several pivotal issues such as the size of future offender population, prison capacity and the capital and operating costs of prisons.

2.3 Degree of Achievement of Objectives

The objectives as stated in AR 190-47 are not entirely being met by the Army Correction Program. The following are the problem areas:

- (1) The screening of restorables at the confinement facilities has been non-uniform.
- (2) The confinement facilities have failed to satisfactorily identify those who are non-restorable.

- (3) By expanding vocational education and work release programs, the USDB can more fully meet Objective 2 (namely, prisoners who are to be returned to civilian life should be given training so that they are capable of assuming civilian responsibilities).
- (4) By assigning to the USARB a higher percentage of the USDB prisoners who request restoration, the Army can better meet Objectives 1 and 2 that deal with the restoration to duty of the maximum possible number of prisoners as responsible well-trained soldiers.


These points are elucidated below.

2.3.1 Non-Uniformity of Screening at the Confinement Facilities

It has been observed that during the period July 1975 to September 1976, the various confinement facilities assigned to the USARB substantially different percentages of their respective prisoner populations that were eligible for such assignment.* Ft. Riley assigned the highest percentage (namely 99.2%) of its eligible prisoners to the USARB, while Ft. Knox assigned the lowest percentage (namely 18.9%). The ranking of sixteen confinement facilities in CONUS in a descending order, starting with Ft. Riley and ending with Ft. Knox is illustrated along the X-axis of Figure 2.1. It has also been observed that the percentage of those discharged as unrestorable at the USARB from among the population that was assigned to the USARB from a confinement facility varied over a wide range from facility to facility. This percentage was the highest for Ft. Riley (namely 74.6%) and the lowest for Ft. Knox (namely 30%). This ranking is illustrated along the Y-axis of Figure 2.1. If the system of rating prisoners in order to identify non-restorables were uniform among the confinement facilities, one would expect that the more stringent a confinement facility is, (i.e., the lower the percent of its eligible prisoners it sends to the USARB) the lower would

*Prisoners eligible to be assigned to the USARB from a confinement facility are defined as those whose sentences do not include a punitive discharge and are not shorter than 30 days.

FIGURE 2.1
Scatter Diagram For Percent Discharged at the USARB
Against Percent of Eligible Prisoners Assigned to the
USARB




be the rate of discharge of its prisoner group at the USARB. In other words, if the screening process is perfectly uniform across all confinement facilities, the two rankings represented along the X and Y axes of Figure 2.1 should be linearly correlated. But, the scatter diagram of Figure 2.1 demonstrates that there is hardly any uniformity in screening as practiced across the various confinement facilities.

2.3.2 Extent of Accomplishment in Meeting Objective 1

Figure 2.2 illustrates the flow of prisoners through the Army correction program during the period 1 January 1976 to 31 August 1976. A majority of prisoners from confinement facilities were either returned directly to duty or assigned to the USARB. Thus the confinement facilities did not impose any restrictions on the return to duty of the maximum possible number of military prisoner after their release. The argument that the direct return to duty of a prisoner from a confinement facility (thereby bypassing the USARB) denies him the opportunity of becoming a well-trained soldier does not seem to be convincing. This is because while the USARB has been very effective in screening out the majority of unrestorables and discharging them, its contribution towards converting a "bad soldier" into a "good soldier" remains undemonstrated. This is substantiated by the fact that only 23% of the prisoners assigned to the USARB (not USARB graduates) received honorable discharge or are in good standing in service as against 32% of direct returnees from confinement facilities who received honorable discharge or are in good standing in service. The USARB graduates of course perform much better than the direct returnees from confinement facilities. But this is primarily due to the fact that only a selected group out of the prisoners assigned to the USARB does indeed graduate at the USARB. The remaining population is screened out as unrestorable and discharged. Hence, by returning a soldier directly to duty from a confinement facility thereby bypassing the USARB, his chance of becoming a well-trained soldier does not get demonstrably hampered. (His assignment to the USARB should however be recommended on the basis of the fact that if he is unrestorable, he should be screened out at an early stage for economic reasons, and the USARB does

FIGURE 2.2 POST-TRIAL PRISONER FLOW MODEL

(1 January to 31 August 1976)



conduct a good screening). As such, the confinement facilities have met Objective 1.

The USARB, on the other hand, in its process of screening out the unrestorables has discharged a number of prisoners who, if restored, would have proved to be good soldiers. There is nothing surprising about it because no screening process can be perfect. Our analysis indicates that approximately 15% of those discharged as unrestorable at the USARB are, in fact, restorable (for details, see Volume III of the Report). To this extent, the USARB has failed in meeting Objective 1. It should however be emphasized that the extent of this failure seems to be well within the range of error that is usually considered acceptable in a screening of this nature.

2.3.3 Extent of Accomplishment in Meeting Objective 2

Follow-up data collected on a sample of 146 prisoners released from the USDB prior to July 1976 indicate that the success in rehabilitation (approximately 10% rearrests during six months after release) of the USDB prisoners compares very favorably with its civilian counterpart. A statistical analysis of the follow-up data indicates that the earning capacity of a releasee from the USDB is positively correlated with his vocational training certification at a 90% to 95% statistical significance level. The analysis further indicates that no significant correlation could be detected between the USDB educational program and the earning capacity over the follow-up period. Yet, 80% of the population participated in educational programs, 60% participated in vocational training programs and only 36% received vocational training certificates. Thus, there is a substantial opportunity for improving the rehabilitative success (Objective 2) of the USDB releasee by expanding the scope of the vocational training program and integrating these programs with industrial work opportunities in the USDB.

There is yet another area where the USDB can improve in meeting Objective 2. Few of the punitive discharge sentenced prisoners who request restoration are actually assigned to the USARB, though Objective 2 clearly prescribes the restoration to duty, if appropriate, of the maximum number of

military prisoners whose sentences include a punitive discharge. It is recommended that a higher percentage of prisoners who request restoration should be considered appropriate for assignment to the USARB.

2.3.4 Extent of Accomplishment in Meeting Objective 3

From Figure 2.2, it follows that out of the total population of prisoners assigned to the USARB, 60% were discharged as non-restorable, and the remaining 40% graduated and were restored to duty. Of those graduates, 58% had honorable discharge or have honorable standing in the Army. Out of the population of prisoners directly returned to duty from the confinement facilities, 32% received honorable discharge or have honorable standing. Thus, the USARB training program has demonstrated reasonable success in identifying and expeditiously discharging those who are non-restorable, and has restored a select population which has performed "better" than those directly returned to duty from confinement facilities. In view of this finding, the confinement facilities would have met the screening objective better if they had assigned all their post-trial prisoners to the USARB. Thus, to the extent that the confinement facilities returned directly to duty a substantial number of prisoners who were eligible for assignment to the USARB, they failed to meet Objective 3.

3.0 ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ARMY CORRECTION PROGRAM

The issues that are addressed in this analysis are:

- (a) What is the cost-effective approach to meet the current objectives of the Army Correction Program?
- (b) Can alternative objectives be formulated so as to realize greater net benefits (i.e., benefits minus costs)?

A breakdown of the expenses, capacity and average daily population of the various facilities during the fiscal year 1976 are illustrated in Table 3.1. The cost items included in Table 3.1 reflect only the direct costs (i.e., OMA and MPA).* Besides these, there are various intangible costs associated with the Army Correction Program. Such intangibles include the negative impact of restoring to duty a prisoner who performs less than satisfactorily, the negative impact of discharging a soldier who, if restored, would have performed satisfactorily, the negative impact on unit morale discipline of expeditiously discharging a criminal without punishing him, etc. While it is difficult to assign dollar values to these intangible factors, it is however possible to estimate the lower bounds on the costs associated with returning a "bad" soldier to duty and discharging a "good" soldier who should have been returned. The cost associated with returning a "bad" soldier to duty is at least his Composite Standard Rate (i.e., salary and other allowances) that is wasted on him from the time he returns to duty to the time he receives a less than honorable discharge. The cost of discharging a good soldier is at least the recruitment and training expenses of his replacement prorated over the length of the period during which the good soldier would have rendered satisfactory service had he been returned to duty instead of being discharged. The actual costs associated with the intangibles are, in all probability, much higher than these two lower bounds. Thus, the pertinence of this economic analysis is limited to

*OMA = Operation and Maintenance Account
MPA = Military Personnel Account

TABLE 3.1 Breakdown of Average Daily Population,
Capacity and Annual Expenses (FY 76)

ITEMS	CONFINEMENT FACILITIES	USARB	USDB
Average Daily Population	701 (482 pretrial, 219 post-trial)	476	1,200
Capacity	3,071	800	1,250
OMA Expenses	\$ 669,000	\$1,508,000	\$ 4,003,000
MPA Expenses	\$26,541,000	\$4,735,000	\$ 7,583,000
Total Expenses	\$27,210,000	\$6,243,000	\$11,586,000

TABLE 3.2 POLICIES ANALYZED

POLICY	DESCRIPTION	IMPLICATIONS
A	STREAMLINE CONFINEMENT FACILITIES (BOTH PRE-TRAIL AND POST-TRIAL)	NO CHANGE IN OBJECTIVES
B	ABOLISH USARB AND MAINTAIN CONFINEMENT FACILITIES - PRETRIAL, POST-TRIAL AND TRAINING	RELAX OBJECTIVES 1 & 3
C	USE CONFINEMENT FACILITIES PRIMARILY FOR PRE-TRIAL CUSTODY AND DIVERT ALL POST-TRIAL SENTENCED PRISONERS TO USARB AND USDB	NO CHANGE IN OBJECTIVES
D	ABOLISH USARB AND RETURN ON SUSPENDED SENTENCE ALL NON-USDB PRISONERS TO DUTY	ABANDON OBJECTIVE 3
E	ABOLISH USARB AND EXPEDITIOUSLY DISCHARGE ALL NON-USDB PRISONERS EXISTING SYSTEM	ABANDON OBJECTIVE 1
F		NO CHANGE

TABLE 3.3 COST BREAKDOWN UNDER SIX DIFFERENT OPTIONS

COST FACTORS	COSTS UNDER VARIOUS OPTIONS (In Millions of Dollars)					OPTION F
	OPTION A	OPTION B	OPTION C	OPTION D	OPTION E	
CONFINEMENT FACILITIES	20.46	27.49	8.54	8.54	8.54	27.21
USARB	5.93	0	6.16	0	0	5.93
TRANSPORTATION	0.70	0	1.10	0	0	0.70
RETURN BAD SOLDIER	4.77	8.94	2.21	8.94	0	4.77
DISCHARGE GOOD SOLDIER	1.78	0	2.88	0	4.34	1.78
TOTAL	33.64	36.43	20.89	17.48	12.88	40.39

A: STREAMLINE CONFINEMENT FACILITIES

B: ABOLISH USARB, MAINTAIN CONFINEMENT FACILITIES

C: PRETRIAL ONLY AT CONFINEMENT FACILITIES

D: RETURN EVERYBODY ON SUSPENDED SENTENCE (EXCEPT USDB PRISONERS)

E: DISCHARGE EVERYBODY EXPEDITIOUSLY (EXCEPT USDB PRISONERS)

F: MAINTAIN STATUS QUO

the cost factors quantified within the analysis. As such the results of the analysis represent a restricted view.

3.1 Costs Associated with Various Alternative Policies

Six different policy alternatives were considered. They are listed in Table 3.2. The corresponding costs are illustrated in Table 3.3. The cost factors considered under each policy alternatives are: (1) the OMA and MPA expenditures for the confinement facilities, (2) the same for the USARB, (3) cost associated with the escorted transportation of prisoners, (4) minimum cost associated with returning to duty prisoners who should have been discharged, and (5) minimum cost associated with discharging prisoners who should have been returned to duty. The cost of maintaining the USDB has been omitted from Table 3.3 because it remains the same under all six policy alternatives. Considerations pertaining to the closure of the USDB are addressed in Section 3.2. Results indicate that Option E is the least expensive in a restricted sense, where E represents the policy of expeditiously discharging all individuals adjudged guilty excepting those assigned to the USDB. However, there are various intangibles associated with this policy option which have not been included in this analysis. They include: (1) the need to change DODI 1325.4 and the Title 10 of U.S. Code, (2) the introduction of a policy which is at variance with the dominant concepts prevalent in civilian correction, (3) the probable accentuation of difficulty in filling the Army quota through recruitment, and (4) the negative impact on unit discipline of allowing an offender to go unpunished. Considering all of these intangible factors, Option E can not be recommended as a desirable policy alternative.

In the same vein, Option D, though apparently less expensive than Option C by approximately \$3 million, is not recommended on the ground that the actual cost of returning a bad soldier to duty is, in all probability, much higher than its lower bound which has been incorporated in the analysis. Hence, in reality, Option D is likely to be more costly than Option C.

As a result, Option C appears to represent the optimal correctional policy. It implies that the confinement facilities should be used to hold

only pre-trial prisoners. All post-trial prisoners should be assigned either to the USDB or the USARB. This will allow a significant reduction in the manpower at the confinement facilities, as elaborated upon in Volume III of the report. The unused space that will be made available to the confinement facilities represents a substantial amount of locked-in capital. The most productive use of this space would be achieved by consolidating other criminal justice activities such as Military Police, and the Office of Judge Advocate General. The details of this consolidation plan will of course vary from installation to installation. This policy alternative results in annual savings of at least \$20 million.

3.2 Economic Considerations Relevant to the USDB

Annual expenses per individual prisoner at the USDB were approximately \$10,000 (i.e., approximately \$27 per prisoner day) during the fiscal year 1976. The corresponding figure in civilian correction was anywhere between \$8,000 to \$20,000 depending on the institution. Thus, cost-wise, the USDB has performed very favorably compared to its civilian counterpart. If the USDB is relinquished to the civilian sector, the annual cost per prisoner will, in all probability, not decrease. Further, if all prisoners who, under the present system are assigned to the USDB are instead transferred to civilian correction on a regular basis as a policy matter, it is only natural to expect that sooner or later it will lead to the transfer of an equivalent amount of budget from the Army Correction Program to civilian corrections. Thus, the automatic transfer of all USDB prisoners to the civilian sector does not constitute a cost-effective program in the long run.

There are, however, a few modifications that can be introduced to make the operation of the USDB more cost-effective. They are:

- (1) Assign to the USARB a larger fraction of those USDB prisoners who request restoration. It should be noted that the optimal restoration level has not, as yet, been determined with any reasonable degree of confidence. Hence the post-restoration performance of such prisoners will have to be monitored over

time in order to determine when the point of diminishing returns has been attained.

- (2) Increase the amount of revenue generated by the vocational training shops. Five vocational training shops were evaluated in this study, namely: Screen Process Printing, Cabinetmaking, Automotive Mechanics, Sheet Metal Product Fabrication, and Welding. The programs were high-quality, well-staffed and more-than-adequately funded. However, the potential for revenue generation is higher than the actual revenue generated by them. The Screen Process Printing Shop, in particular, can double or triple its current production level. There is sufficient market demand to justify this increase in production. Coupled with the fact that the post-release income level of prisoners is highly correlated with their vocational training (see Section 2.3.3) it is recommended that the vocational training shops pursue higher production levels wherever possible, so as to generate larger revenues as well as attain greater rehabilitative success.

4.0 MANAGEMENT AND PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS

The performance standards governing the Army Correction Program as established by AR 190-47 exceed in detail and scope, the correction performance standards presently applied in the civilian sector. However, the overall performance of the Army Correction Program is degraded by:

- (1) Severe imbalance between correctional/confinement populations and capacities, staff, facilities, space etc. (see Table 4.1), and
- (2) Lack of system response to this imbalance.

A study of the prisoner population over an 18-month period (May 1975 to November 1976) indicates that the problem of imbalance and lack of system response is not of a transient nature, but has persisted at least since 1975. This is illustrated in Figure 4.1. Another interesting observation is illustrated in Figure 4.2 which indicates that as the total number of prisoners has been decreasing, the percentage of post-trial prisoners has been increasing. Army increase of post-trial prisoners at a given confinement facility decreases the cost per prisoner day at that facility, but certainly does not decrease the total cost of the Army Correction Program. Figure 4.3 illustrates that the response of the confinement facilities to the decreasing correctional population does not reflect a central, coordinated Army-wide policy.

In the broad context of the lack of a system response to the imbalance between facility capacities and prisoner populations, the following specific problems have been identified:

- (1) The excess staff observed at the time of survey is a result of not responding to the decreasing prisoner population in a timely fashion. Differential interests of the MACOM's may have played a part in not decreasing the respective staff positions.
- (2) There is no uniformity in the management of pretrial confinement.

TABLE 4.1 Facility Prisoner Populations and Capacities*

	Standard Capacity	Average Prisoner Pop	Authorized Staff Including Civilian Personnel	Staff/Prisoner Ratio
USDB	1,343	1,163	821	0.71/1
USARB	1,200	412	442	1.07/1
FT. DIX	416	34	169	4.97/1
FT. KNOX	162	48	209	4.35/1
FT. ORD	171	42	174	4.14/1

* Based on last day of month figures Jan- Nov 76

FIGURE 4.1 Prisoner Population by Month* For 18-Month Period, May 1975 to November 1976



FIGURE 4.2 Prison Population vs. Sentenced Prisoners At CONUS Confinement Facilities (ACF's and ICF's)





FIGURE 4.3
% Pre-Trial At Selected Study Sites Compared To
A11 TRADOC Confinement Facilities



- (3) There is no uniform evaluation of programs.
- (4) Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (DCSPER) is not responsible for evaluation of facility compliance.
- (5) There is no systemwide corrections planning information on projected populations, trends by type of crime, post-restoration performance, etc.
- (6) Prisoner status reports from various confinement facilities do not consistently conform to Army regulations.
- (7) Except for the USDB (and to a certain extent the USARB), correctional budgeting system at facilities does not permit facility-level fiscal management in the sense that line item functional budgets for correction/confinement do not exist. For example, the portion of the total overhead expenditure of the Fort that should be carried by the confinement facility cannot always be readily determined. As such, it is difficult to conduct routine program evaluation based on cost-benefit analysis.
- (8) Status reports from confinement facilities are "summarized" at TRADOC and FORSCOM corrections management branches using different formats. This in turn results in systemwide reporting errors occurring at the DCSPER level. A more precise system is required.
- (9) Separate corrections management branches at TRADOC and FORSCOM lead to unnecessary duplication of functions.

An effective way to rectify the above situation is to consolidate the management responsibilities into a simple corrections management activity at the Department of Army level without intermediate influence. The management responsibility for the USDB and the USARB, as well as the research and evaluation unit presently located at the USARB should all be consolidated within the scope of this centralized activity. The individual confinement facilities should be restricted to confining only pretrial prisoners and optimally utilize the empty spaces to establish "Military Justice Centers"

which would consolidate other related functions such as Post JAG and Military Police. As Military Justice Centers will not be required to confine post trial prisoners, there will be no need for correctional programs at the Military Justice Centers.

5.0 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE WORK

If the Army plans to implement the recommendations previously described for the attainment of a cost-effective program, there will be an immediate need for the following:

- (1) A centralized management information system which will monitor the system, detect variations, suggest remedies and the associated costs. This system will be functional in its format and will be a useful tool both for day-to-day management of the Army Correction Program as well as for future planning.
- (2) An idle capacity utilization for confinement facilities. Since each confinement facility is unique, it will be necessary to consider its individual needs, the space and manpower needed to deal with only the pretrial populations, and the plan for optimal utilization of the idle capacity created thereby.
- (3) A design of USDB vocational/industrial work programs offering increased revenue and improved rehabilitation. Such a design will include a job market survey to identify the training programs most useful for post-release employment, a prison manpower analysis to identify the available manpower pool taking into account the institutional constraints on the training/work day, the academic/vocational skill levels of the inmate labor force and the match between the sentence length and required time of various vocational/industrial work programs, a product market survey to identify the products for which sufficient demand exists and which are relatively free from union pressures, a financial analysis to determine the requirement of additional capital, the wage structure of workers, profitability, etc.